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THE UTAH DIGITAL SIGNATURE ACT
AS "MODEL" LEGISLATION: A
CRITICAL ANALYSIS
by R. JASON
I.

RICHARDSt

INTRODUCTION

It has been suggested that the Internet 1 is "the most profound transformation a technology has brought since the capture of fire." 2 This
statement may not be too far from the truth. In simpler days, business
transactions consisted of nothing more than a pen, paper, and face-toface contact.3 The Internet has changed all that. Today, parties are just
as likely to communicate in the new and sophisticated world of "cyberspace" than in any other medium, thereby "replacing physical interaction
with virtual communications," 4 and, in the process, creating opportunit B.A., B.A., University of Alabama at Birmingham; J.D., The John Marshall Law
School; LL.M. candidate, DePaul University College of Law.
1. The term "Internet" is defined as "a set of computer networks-possibly dissimilar-joined together by means of gateways that handle data transfer and the conversion of
messages from the standing network to the protocols used by the receiving network."
MICROSOFT PRESS COMPUTER DICTIONARY 220 (2d ed. 1994).
2. Internet Symposium: Legal PotholesAlong The Information Superhighway, 16 Loy.
L.A. ENT. L.J. 541, 601 (1996).
3. Diana J.P. McKenzie, Commerce on the Net: Surfing Through Cyberspace Without
Getting Wet, 14 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 247, 247 (1996).
4. Daniel V. Logue, Note, If the InternationalShoe Fits, Wear It: Applying Traditional
PersonalJurisdictionAnalysis to Cyberspace in Compuserve, Inc. v. Patterson, 42 VILL. L.
REV. 1213, 1213 (1997). Current figures put the number of Internet users in the United
States and Canada alone at 58 million. G. Christian Hill, Adult Users of the Net in U.S.
and Canada Put at 58 Million, WALL ST. J., Dec. 11, 1997, at *1.
While the prospect of a purely paperless society is intriguing, it is unlikely that this
ideal will ever come to fruition. First, paper has an unparalleled record of superiority when
it comes to long-term storage. See Michael L. Closen & R. Jason Richards, Notaries Public-Lost in Cyberspace, Or Key Business Professionals of the Future?, 15 J. MARSHALL J.
COMPUTER

& INFO. L. 703, 715 (1997) [hereinafter Closen & Richards, Lost in Cyberspace].

Second, "as crude as it may be, a piece of paper.., enjoys many security advantages over a
document on a computer's hard disk." MICHAEL L. CLOSEN ET AL., NOTARy LAW AND PRACTICE: CASES AND MATERIALS 35 (1997) [hereinafter NOTARY LAw] (quoting Charles N.
Faerber, The Notary and EDI, Paper presented to Work Group on Notarization and
Nonrepudiation, ABA Information Security Comm., Jan. 10, 1993). Third, the sophisti-
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ties for electronic commerce that were unimaginable not too long ago. 5
Not surprisingly, much has been written about the many new legal
issues this emerging commercial forum presents. 6 One aspect of electronic commerce that has received considerable scholarly and legislative
cated nature of electronic communications may alienate potential users, meaning that
"[slome people will not learn the technology[,] [slome will not be able to afford the technology[,] and [s]ome will not trust in the technology or those who control it." Closen & Richards, Lost in Cyberspace, supra, at 715. Finally, paper records will likely survive into the
future because "[slome documents, like original, recorded deeds . .. , should not be destroyed even if digital backup files exist." Paul Berstein, The PaperlessDesktop-A Virtual
Reality?, TRIAL, Mar. 1997, at 54, 57.
5. See Daniel J. Greenwood & Ray A. Campbell, Electronic Commerce Legislation:
From Written on Paperand Signed in Ink to Electronic Records and Online Authentification, 53 Bus. LAw. 307, 307 (1997); see also R. J. Robertson, Electronic Commerce on the
Internet and the Statute of Frauds,49 S.C. L. REv. 787, 824 (1998) (noting that "technological developments have brought about a revolution in communication and business practices, centering on the use of personal computers connected through a web of networks
commonly known as the 'Internet.'"); William E. Wyrough Jr. & Ron Mien, The Electronic
Signature Act of 1996: Breaking Down Barriers to Widespread Electronic Commerce in
Florida,24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 407, 414 (1997) ("Society is rapidly advancing forward to a
day when information technologies will be an integral part of daily life.").
6. A small sample of the many legal issues cyberspace has presented include:
Jurisdiction.See, e.g., John Gilbert, Questions of Authority: JurisdictionCases Crop Up As
Internet Sales EraseBorders, 83 A.B.A. J. 42, June 1992; Craig P. Gaumer, The Minimum
Cyber-Contacts Test: An Emerging Standard of Constitutional Personal Jurisdiction, 85
ILL. B.J. 58 (1997); Todd H. Flaming, The Rules of Cyberspace: Informal Law in a New
Jurisdiction,174 ILL. B.J. 85 (1997); Juan Andres Avellan V., John Hancock in Borderless
Cyberspace: The Cross-JurisdictionalValidity of Electronic Signatures and Certificates in
Recent Legislative Texts, 38 JURIMETRICS J. 301 (1998); David L. Stott, Personal Jurisdiction in Cyberspace: The ConstitutionalBoundary of Minimum Contacts Limited To a Web
Site, 15 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 819 (1997); Richard S. Zembeck, Jurisdiction
and the Internet, FundamentalFairnessin the Networked World of Cyberspace, 6 ALB. L. J.
Sci. & TECH. 339 (1996); Martin F. Noonan, Civil Procedure-PersonalJurisdiction:Evolving CurrentInterpretationof the Stream of Commerce Test in the Third Circuit, 40 VILL. L.
REv. 779 (1995). See generally M. Ethan Katsh, Dispute Resolution in Cyberspace, 28
CONN. L. REV. 953 (1996). See, e.g., Edward Geller, Conflicts of Law in Cyberspace: Rethinking InternationalCopyright in a DigitallyNetworked World, 20 CoLum-VLA J. L. &
ARTs 571 (1996); I. Trotter Hardy, The ProperLegal Regime for "Cyberspace," 55 U. PITT. L.
REv. 993-1051-53 (1994).
The First Amendment. See generally Bruce W. Sanford & Michael J. Lorenger, Teaching
An Old Dog New Tricks: The FirstAmendment in an Online World, 28 CONN. L. REV. 1137
(1996); Donald E. Lively, The Information Superhighway: A First Amendment Roadmap,
35 B.C. L. REV. 1067 (1994).
Antitrust law. See generally Mark Lemley, Antitrust and the Internet Standardization
Problem, 28 CONN. L. REv. 1041 (1996).
Defamation law. See generally Robert B. Charles & Jacob H. Zamansky, Liability for Online Libel After Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co., 28 CONN. L. REV. 1173
(1996).
Obscenity Law. See generally Eric Handelman, Comment, Obscenity and the Internet: Does
the Current Obscenity StandardProvide Individuals with the Proper ConstitutionalSafeguards?, 59 ALB. L. REV. 709 (1995).
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attention to date involves "electronic" and "digital" signature technology.7 The first state to address the matter was Utah, which resulted in
the adoption of the Utah Digital Signature Act ("the Utah Act") in 1995.
Since that time, over 35 states and jurisdictions passed some form of digital or electronic signature legislation, and most of the remaining jurisdictions are considering similar laws. 8 Of the legislation thus far
enacted, most take the form of either comprehensive guidelines, 9 or very
brief directives that authorize the use of electronic or digital signature
technology generally. 10 Regardless of which legislative approach is
adopted, however, the common thread that runs through each is that
they replicate, or at least mimic, Utah's approach. What are the implications of this replication? With so many states eager to jump on the "electronic bandwagon," are states sacrificing legislative form over legislative
substance? Numerous legal commentators believe so. 11 Just as the old
Electronic contracting. See generally Raymond T. Nimmer, Electronic Contracting: Legal
Issues, 14 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 211 (1996).
Other online issues. See generally McKenzie, supra note 3, at 247 (addressing several legal
issues relating to transacting business in cyberspace).
7. See, e.g., Closen & Richards, Lost in Cyberspace, supra note 4, at 703; Benjamin
Wright, Eggs in Baskets: Distributingthe Risks of Electronic Signatures, J. MARSHALL J.
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 189 (1997); David P. Vandagriff, The Metaphoris the Key: Cryptography, the Clipper Chip, and the Constitution, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 709 (1995); Wendy R. Leibowitz, Technology and the Law Meet Online Commerce: "DigitalSignature" Guidelines and
an Upgraded U.C.C. Will Ease Internet Transactions,An LA. Court Tries It Out, 18 NAT'L
L.J. 49 (1996); Gary W. Frensen, What Lawyers Should Know About Digital Signatures,
170 ILL. B.J. 85 (1997); Timothy Tomlinson, Legitimizing Contracts in Cyberspace: The
ABA's New Guidelines Create a Legal Infrastructure for Using Digital Signatures, NAT'L
L.J., May 5, 1997, at Bll; UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-3-106 (1998) ("Utah Digital Signature

Act").
8. See, e.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-121 (West Supp. 1997); CONN. GEN. STAT.

§§ 19a-25a (1997); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 282.70 to 75 (West Supp. 1998); IOWA CODE § 48A.13
(Supp. 1998); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:2144 (West Supp. 1998); MINN. STAT. § 221.173
(Supp. 1998); N.M. STAT. ANN §§ 14-15-1 to 6 (Michie Supp. 1997); (UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 463-101 to 504 (Supp. 1997); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 19.34.010 to 903 (West Supp. 1998).
9. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-3-106 (1998); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 19.34.010
(West 1998).
10. Michael L. Closen & R. Jason Richards, Cyberbusiness Needs Supernotaries,NAT'L
L. J., Aug. 25, 1997, at A19 [hereinafter Supernotaries]. See, e.g., KAN STAT. ANN. § 602616(c) (Supp. 1997).
11. See, e.g., Closen & Richards, Lost in Cyberspace, supra note 4, at 703 (discussing
cybernotarial legislation and analyzing the role of such laws and the shortcomings of current and proposed legislation); Closen & Richards, Supernotaries,supra note 10, at A19
(arguing that Utah's digital signature statute, which has become the model for several
states, is inadequate in many respects); Wright, supra note 7, at 189 (endorsing Pen Biometrics Technology ("PENOP") in lieu of Utah's public key cryptography approach); Robertson, supra note 5, at 824 (arguing that Utah's statute is, among other things, "too narrow
because it limits electronic messages that satisfy the Statute of Frauds to those that are
digitally signed"); C. Bradford Biddle, Comment, Misplaced Priorities:The Utah Digital
Signature Act and Liability Allocation in a Public Key Infrastructure, 33 SAN DIEGO L.
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saying goes, "hard cases make bad law,"1 2 so too, the author believes, do
"bad [laws] bring about worse [laws]."13 Thus, it is particularly important to expose the potential weaknesses in the Utah Act in light of its
rapidly-accepted, yet troubling status as "model" legislation. Several of
the Utah Act's provisions create problem areas which will only foster additional uncertainties as to how digital and electronic signature legislation and practice will work together. These uncertainties cast
considerable doubts about the law's effectiveness and its rightful place in
shaping both the practice and regulation of certification authorities
throughout this country.' 4 These problem areas are the focus of this article. However, the purpose of this article is not to discourage the evolution of digital signature or electronic signature legislation; rather, its
purpose is to call attention to a variety of problematic issues found
therein, for it is hoped that calling attention to the problems will help to
correct the weaknesses.
This article provides a brief discussion of what a digital signature is,
how it works generally, and the players involved in the process. It will
then review numerous provisions of the Utah Act, including recommendations for improvements to current legislation. Finally, this article concludes that the Utah Act, while significant for the simple act of
stimulating interest in electronic commerce, is not the model Act many
believe it to be. The author's hope is that the suggestions offered in this
article will promote remedial state action surrounding digital and electronic signature legislation.
II.

ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES AND DIGITAL
SIGNATURES DEFINED

There are two general categories of legislation related to electronic
signatures: electronic signature legislation and digital signature legislation. 15 These two forms of legislation, while technologically distinct, are
often used interchangeably, and thus, not always readily distinguishable. 16 Indeed, numerous definitions of the term "electronic signature"
REV. 1143 (1996) (discussing the misplaced priorities surrounding the allocation of liability
and evidentiary burdens of Utah's law).
12. Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. noting that "Great cases like hard cases make bad law").
13. JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 358 (15th ed. 1980) (quoting Jean Jacques
Rousseau (1762)).
14. See Closen & Richards, Supernotaries,supra note 10, at A19.
15. See Greenwood & Campbell, supra note 5, at 316; see also Wyrough & Klein, supra
note 5, at 424 (stating that digital signatures are a form of electronic technology).
16. See Theodore S. Barassi, Electronic Signature Differs from Digital, 214 N.Y. L.J.
102 (1995); INFORMATION SECURITY COMMITTEE, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, DIGITAL SIGNATURE GUIDELINES: LEGAL INFRASTRUCTURE FOR CERTIFICATION AUTHORITIES AND SECURE

ELECTRONIC COMMERCE

35 (1996) [hereinafter DIGITAL SIGNATURE GUIDELINES].
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exist. For instance, Florida law defines electronic signature as "any letters, characters, or symbols, manifested by electronic or similar means,
executed or adopted by a party with an intent to authenticate a writing." 17 Illinois law, on the other hand, defines electronic signature as
"digital technology," noting that electronic signatures include "electrical,
digital, magnetic, optical, electromagnetic, or any other form of technology that entails capabilities similar to these technologies."' 8
The primary difference between digital signatures and electronic
signatures is that the digital signature approach uses a specific type of
technology, while the electronic signature method does not. 19 More specifically, "digital signature" is a term usually reserved for signatures
20
which implement public key or asymmetric cryptographic systems,
while "electronic signature" refers generically to any electronic technology intended by the party to validate a writing. 2 1 The distinction here is
more than semantic; indeed, each term has independent legal significance. 22 Evidentiary proceedings, for example, favor digital signatures,
whose specific, security-conscious method of identification provides proof
of message integrity and non-repudiation by the document signer. 23 On
the other hand, electronic signatures do not receive the same evidentiary
presumption of validity because they are unverifiable and subject to both
forgery and repudiation by the signer. 2 4 Of course, these evidentiary
presumptions are subject to change depending upon the statutory
25
makeup of the law in question.
17. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 282.72(4) (West 1998).
18. ILLINOIS ATTORNEY GENERAL JIM RYAN'S COMMISSION ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE
AND CRIME, FINAL REPORT (May 26, 1998) [hereinafter ILLINOIS ACT]. See also GA. CODE
ANN. § 10-12-3 (1998) ("Georgia Electronic Records and Signature Act") ("Electronic Signature'" means an electronic or digital method executed or adopted by a party with the intent
to be bound by or to authenticate a record, which is unique to the person using it, and is
linked to data in such a manner that if the date are changed the electronic signature is
invalidated.")
19. See Barassi, supra note 16, at 102; Symposium: Tutorial, 38 JuRIMETRICs J. 243,
244 (1998); Maureen S. Dorney, Doing Business on the Internet: The Law of Electronic Commerce, 491 PLIIPat 141, 145 (1997).
20. Compare UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-3-103(2) (1998) ("Utah Digital Signature Act") (implementing an the asymmetric cryptosystem) with GA. CODE ANN. § 10-12-3 (1998) ("Georgia Electronic Records and Signature Act") (defining electronic signature as "an electronic
or digital method executed or adopted by a party with the intent to be bound by or to
authenticate a record . .

").

21. See Barassi, supra note 16, at 102; Greenwood & Campbell, supra note 5, at 31718.
22. See Barassi, supra note 16, at 102.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Compare ILLINOIS ACT, supra note 18, § 10-110(a)(1)-(3) (establishing a rebuttable
presumption that the electronic signature is of the individual to whom it correlates so long
as the qualified security procedure was commercially reasonable, applied in trustworthy

878

JOURNAL OF COMPUTER & INFORMATION LAW

[Vol. XVII

Technical and evidentiary assumptions aside, the cornerstone of
both electronic signature and digital signature legislation is the existing
common law notion that a signature can take the form of any mark so
long as it was intended by the signer to validate a writing.2 6 Representative of this common law doctrine is Kansas' act which states that "a
digital signature may be accepted as a substitute for, and, if accepted,
27
shall have the same force and effect as, any other form of signature."
III.

THE BASICS OF DIGITAL SIGNATURE TECHNOLOGY
AND VERIFICATION

There are numerous ways to create digital signatures. 28 These
methods range from simple acts, such as typing your name on an e-mail
message, to more elaborate and secure acts, such as fingerprint or voice
scans.2 9 One thing that each of these identification features have in
common is that none resembles a traditional handwritten signature. Instead, the "signature" takes the form of letters, numbers, and/or symbols
manner, and relied upon reasonably and in good faith) with FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 282.70-75
(West 1998) (failing to establish any evidentiary presumptions concerning the identity of
the sender of the message or the integrity of the message's content).
26. Brown v. Butchers and Drovers' Bank, 6 Hill 443, 444 (N.Y. 1844) ("A person may
be bound by any mark or designation he thinks proper to adopt, provided it be used as a
substitute for his name."). As noted in an early opinion by the Illinois Supreme Court:
We think it makes no difference, so far as the defendant's liability is concerned
whether he wrote his name in script or Roman letters, or whether such letters
were made with a pen or with type, or whether he printed, engraved, photographed or lithographed them, so long as he adopted and issued the signature as
his own. It is true, that a written signature in script, may be a safer mode of
subscribing one's name, but where a party has adopted a signature made in any
other mode, and had issued an instrument with such adopted signature, for value,
he is estopped from denying its validity.
Weston v. Myers, 33 Ill. 424, 432 (1864).
27. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-2616(c) (Supp. 1997). See also MiNN. STAT. ANN.
§ 325K.19(4)(b) (West 1998) (stating that a verified electronic signature satisfies the legal
requirements of a signature); UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-3-401 (1998) (stating that a verified
digital signature satisfies the legal requirements of a signature); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 282.73
(West 1998) (noting that "an electronic signature may be used to sign a writing and shall
have the same force and effect as a written signature."). The flexibility of this common law
doctrine has enabled courts to expand its meaning to account for all kinds of modern technologies. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 70 F.3d 1353 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding that the
unauthorized use of a PIN number to withdraw funds was forgery insofar as it was "tantamount to cashing a check with a forged signature."); Spevak, Cameron & Boyd v. National
Comm. Bank of New Jersey, 677 A.2d 1168 (App. Ct. N.J. 1996) (finding that using an
account number as an endorsement constituted a signature).
28. Greenwood & Campbell, supra note 5, at 309.
29. Id. Analogous verification procedures for creating electronic signatures include:
'magnetic stripe cards with personal identification numbers (PIN's), user names and passwords, public-key cryptography, writing tablets with electronic pens, and even smart cards
that generate a unique access code every few seconds." Id.
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juxtaposed through a series of mathematical formulas, or algorithms. 30
Although there are many methods for creating a digital signature,
one of the most widely used technologies for authentication purposes today is known as "public key" or "asymmetric cryptography." 3 1 Asymmetric cryptography is accomplished by implementing encryption/decryption
software, a process in which the message and signature can be scrambled by the sender and unscrambled by the recipient using the same type
of electronic "key pairs." 32 First, the transmitter, using a "private key"
known only to him or her, encrypts the message and signature with a
pass-phrase (e.g., personal identification number) and sends it to the recipient. 33 The resulting encryption is the digital signature or "hash result,"34 which is unique to each document and, thus, produces a new
35
hash result or "signature" with each transmission.
30. Closen & Richards, Lost in Cyberspace, supra note 4, at 734-35. For example, when
printed a digital signature looks something like this:
-Digital SignatureowHtWXlsU1UUP+91G+22ysbHnDHcBeZAVmq7L9iAuNJ2UuhX2suUSpaufVsftu8£
ylkUXTGsGHAgsE
-End SignatureILLINOIS ACT, supra note 18, at 18 cmt. 4.
31. Greenwood & Campbell, supra note 5, at 310; Closen & Richards, Lost in Cyberspace, supra note 4, at 734. See also Anthony Martin Singer, Note, Electronic Commerce:
Digital Signatures and the Role of the Kansas Digital Signature Act, 37 WASHBURN L. J.
725, 729 (1998) ("The technology most associated with digital signatures is asymmetric
encryption.").
32. DIGITAL SIGNATURE GUIDELINES, supranote 16, at 8; Michael D. Wims, Law and the
Electronic Highway: Are Computer Signatures Legal?, CRIMINAL JUSTICE MAG., Spring
1995, at 31.
33. Closen & Richards, Lost in Cyberspace, supra note 4, at 735.
34. Kenneth A. Freeling & Ronald E. Wiggins, States Develop Rules for Using Digital
Signatures: Laws That Govern Transactions Using Public Key Cryptography Will Spur
Electronic Commerce, NAT'L L. J., Oct. 20, 1997, at Cll; DIGITAL SIGNATURE GUIDELINES,
supra note 16, at 9.
35. Closen & Richards, Lost in Cyberspace, supra note 4, at 736. This unique two-key
system is central to the security of public key encryption technology. By comparison, consider the most commonly used verification process known as "private key" or "symmetric"
electronic cryptography. See generally Dorney, supra note 19, at 145; Phillip E. Reiman,
Cryptography and the FirstAmendment: The Right to be Unheard, 14 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 325, 328 (1996); Wyrough & Klien, supra note 5, at 422. In symmetric
cryptography, text is created and deciphered using a single key. Dorney, supra note 19, at
145. Thus the same secret key is used by both the sender to encrypt data and by the recipient to decrypt it to its original form. See Charles R. Merrill, Proofof Who, What and When
In Electronic Commerce Under the Digital Signature Guidelines, 525 PLI/Pat 129, 133
(1998); Dorney, supra note 19, at 145; see Reiman, at 329; Wyrough & Klein, supra, note 5
at 422. Therein lies the principle weakness of symmetric cryptography. For example, if,
during the exchange of information, an unauthorized third party intercepts the key, then
he or she can pose as the authorized sender of the transmission. See Dorney, supra note 19,
at 145; Wyrough & Klein, supra note 5, at 422; Greenwood & Campbell, supra note 5, at
310-11. Moreover, because the key is not unique to each user, its use permits repudiation
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After receiving the document, the recipient runs a program and
decrypts the sender's document and signature by using the "public key"
36
(which is made publicly available online) to the encrypting private key.
The program then compares the private key with the public key to determine if the document sent has been altered since its original transmission. 3 7 If unaltered, the two keys will match and the recipient can be
reasonably confident that the subscriber actually executed the document. 38 If, however, the document was changed between execution and
verification the hashes will differ, meaning that the signature has in
39
some way been compromised and will fail verification.
The security of asymmetric cryptography may be enhanced by adding length to the key pairs. 40 By increasing the possible key pairs to be
deciphered, the likelihood that a "hacker" can randomly decode the numerous combinations is significantly reduced. Even with a strong algorithm, a public key pair with a short key length can be "cracked" by the
"brute force" approach using the random generation of all of the possible
public/private key pair combinations for a given public key until the
third party uncovers the correct private key. 4 1 While longer key pairs
provide heightened security in asymmetric cryptography, even professional cryptographers point out that no encryption scheme is completely
invulnerable. 4 2 Nevertheless, digital signature technology which impleby the sender of the message (i.e. it is possible for the sender to claim that someone else
compromised the key and avoid liability). See Dorney, supra note 19, at 145. Because of
these deficiencies, most security-conscious states to have enacted comprehensive digital
signature legislation have adopted the asymmetric methodology, which eliminates the need
for users to share a secret key and, thus, reduces the risks associated with single key cryptography. See Dorney, supra note 19, at 145; Greenwood & Campbell, supra note 5, at 313;
Lonnie Eldridge, Internet Commerce and the Meltdown of CertificationAuthorities: Is the
Washington State Solution a Good Model?, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1805, 1811 (1998). See, e.g.,
UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-3-103(2) (1998).

36. Merrill, supra note 35, at 131; Robertson, supra note 5, at 820.
37. Closen & Richards, Lost in Cyberspace, supra note 4, at 736.
38. John B. Kennedy & Shoshana R. Davids, Bartleby the Cryptographer:Legal Profession Preparesfor DigitalSignatures, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 22, 1996, at S4.
39. Id; Greenwood & Campbell, supra note 4, at 314; DIGITAL SIGNATURE GUIDELINES,
supra note 16, at 35 cmt. 1.11.2.
40. See Dorney, supra note 19, at 146 (stating that the greater the length of key, the
more difficult it is to corrupt); Christy Tinnes, Student Work, Digital Signatures Come to
South Carolina: The Proposed Digital Signature Act of 1997, 48 S.C. L. REV. 427, 429
(1997) (stating that while the industry standard is a 40-bit key, longer keys provide better
security).

41. Dorney, supra note 19, at 145-46.
42. Id; see also Victoria Slind-Flor, Moving Into Cyberspace as Notaries, The Need to
Authenticate ElectronicDocuments Is a New Frontierfor Attorneys, 18 NAT'L L. J. 16 (1995)
(stating that the encryption system is vulnerable to corruption); Elizabeth Wasserman,
Signing on with Digital Signatures-New Laws May Allow Computer Validation, PHOENIX
GAz., Aug. 29, 1995, at Al (noting that no computer system is perfectly secure). See gener-
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ments cryptographic methodology is still considered very secure in that,
while not absolutely fool-proof, it is "computationally impossible" to de43
duce one key solely from knowledge of the other key.
IV.

CERTIFICATION AUTHORITIES ("CYBERNOTARIES")

An integral part of the digital signature verification process is determining whether the person who sent the message is really who he or she
purports to be. This authentication function is rooted deep in history,
having been performed for the past 350 years by public officers known as
notaries public. 44 Similarly, current cryptographic protocols dictate that
cyber-verifications are to be accomplished by neutral and trusted third
parties called certification authorities or "cybernotaries" 45 (hereinafter
certification authorities). As the term implies, there are inherent similarities between traditional notaries public and certification authorially Gary W. Fresen, What Lawyers Should Known About DigitalSignatures, 170 ILL. B. J.
85 (1997).

43.

BRUCE SCHNEIER, APPLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY: PROTOCOLS, ALGORITHMS AND SOURCE

CODE IN C § 2.6, 33-40 (2d ed. 1996). See also Greenwood & Campbell, supra note 4, at 314
(stating that "public-key cryptography allows people and businesses to exchange messages
over open networks with a high degree of confidence that those messages are confidential.. ., authentic..., and accurate.. ."); Wright, supra note 7, at 194 ("Public-key cryptography can be very effective in showing whether a particular document was signed with a
certain private key."); Biddle, supra note 11, at 1144 (noting that "awell-functioning public
key infrastructure could allow private individuals, businesses, and government to routinely
and securely conduct ... [business] ...over.., the Internet"); Eldridge, supra note 35, at
1807-08 ("Public-key cryptography allows parties... to exchange information safely...");
44. See Michael L. Closen, The Public Official Role of the Notary, 31 J. MARSHALL L.
REV. 651, 701 (1998) (noting that "[niotaries have been on the North American continent
for more that 350 years."). Notaries are, by and large, considered public officials. See, e.g.,
Closen, supra, at 651 (stating that a notary is a public official); RICHARD B. HUMPHREY, THE
AMERICAN NOTARY MANUAL 209 (4th ed. 1948) (stating that "[tihe office of notary pubic is a
public office . . ."); Britton v. Niccolls, 104 U.S. 757, 765 (1881) (stating that a notary is a

public official); May v. Jones, 14 S.E. 552, 553 (Ga. 1891) (stating "the notary ...is a public
officer, sworn to discharge his duties properly"). But see Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Valley
Nat'l Bank, 462 P.2d 814, 817 (Ariz. App. 1969) ("designat[ing] a notary public as .... at
best .... quasi-public [in] nature"); OR. REV. STAT. § 194.010(6) (1996) (indicating that notarial acts are not considered official duties under the Oregon Constitution).
45. Closen & Richards, Lost in Cyberspace, supra note 4, at 737; Merrill, supra note 35,
at 134; Robertson, supra note 5, at 820; Brian W. Smith, Digital Signatures: The State of
the Art of the Law, 114 BANIUNG L.J. 506, 508 (1997); A. Michael Froomkin, The Essential
Role of Trusted Third Parties in Electronic Commerce, 75 OR. L. REv. 49, 49 (1996). See
also Michael L. Closen & G. Grant Dixon III, Notaries Public From the Time of the Roman
Empire to the United States Today, and Tomorrow, 68 N.D. L. REV. 873, 875 (1992)
(describing notaries as highly trustworthy). The phrase "cybernotary" was coined by the
American Bar Association to describe persons engaged in the certification and authentification functions surrounding online transactions. John C. Yates, Recent Legal Issues in Electronic Commerce and Electronic Interchange,430 PRAC. L. INST. 271, 300 (1996).
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ties. 46 Both are creatures of statute. 47 Both are typically licensed or
commissioned by the state. 48 Both engage primarily in the process of
identification. 4 9 Both occupy a position of public trust. 50 And certification authorities will, as notaries now do, eventually affect commercial
51
transactions worth thousands or millions of dollars annually.
Despite these general similarities, the functional differences between certification authorities and notaries public are many and varied.
For instance, unlike their contemporary counterparts, certification authorities may, but need not be, human beings. Certification authorities
can, for example, take the form of financial institutions, accounting
firms, trust companies, and the like. 5 2 Moreover, while current notarial
law requires the signer of the document to personally appear before the
notary in order to confirm the person's identity, 53 cybernotarial legislation dictates that a certification authority's acknowledgment of a digital
signature is valid whether the signer physically appeared before the certification authority when the digital signature was created so long as cer54
tain procedural requirements are followed.
Perhaps the most significant difference between certification authorities and traditional notaries public is that certification authorities use
sophisticated computer technology with which to identify document signers. As a result, certification authorities need a good working knowledge
of computer technology to function efficiently and effectively. 55 By com46. See DIGITAL SIGNATURE GUIDELINES, supra note 16, at 31 cmt. 1.6.3 (stating that
cybernotaries' role is to mimic those of the common law notary, and typically practice in
international, computer-based transactions).
47. See Closen & Richards, Lost in Cyberspace, supra note 4, at 739 ("Cyberotaries...
are regulated by statute."); RICHARD B. HUMPHREY, THE AMERICAN NOTARY MANUAL 209
(4th ed. 1948) (stating "the law is sole source of [the notary's] authority...).
48. Closen & Richards, Lost in Cyberspace, supra note 4, at 739. Unlike notaries public, who must be licensed by the state to act, licensing of cybernotaries is voluntary in most
states. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.34.100(7) (West 1998).
49. See Biddle, supra note 11, at 1178-79.
50. See Gombech v. Department of State, 692 A.2d 1127, 1132 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1997)
(referring to the office of notary as a "position of public trust."); Farm Bureau Fin. Co. v.
Carney, 605 P.2d 509, 514 (Idaho 1980) (finding that "the notary [is] a public officer in a
position of public trust"); Closen & Richards, Lost in Cyberspace, supra note 4, at 757 (stating that "cybernotaries . . . will occupy positions of esteem.").
51. Closen & Richards, Supernotaries,supra note 10, at A19.
52. Froomkin, supra note 45, at 55. See also Dorney, supra note 19, at 148 (describing
certification authorities as "organizations"); Wyrough & Klien, supra note 5, at 426 ("Certification [a]uthorities can be either public or private entities"); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325K01
(Subd. 5) (West 1998) ("'Certification' authority means a person who issues a certificate").
53. See R. Jason Richards, Stop! ... Go Directly To Jail, Do Not Pass Go, and Do Not
Ask for a Notary, 31 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 879, 880 (1998).
54. UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-3-405 (Supp. 1998).

55. See Glen-Peter Ahlers Sr., The Impact of Technology on the Notary Process, 31 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 911, 925 (1998) ("While much of the digital signature technology can be
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parison, consider that the most sophisticated technology associated with
the notary profession is the notary seal. The notary seal, which evolved
slowly over time, progressing from the waxen seal of early Rome to the
present day inked stamp or metal embosser,5 6 is sometimes used incorrectly,5 7 and is even being eliminated as a requirement on paper documents in some states.5 8 Suffice it to say that certification authorities will
be quite different from yesterday's notary in both practice and expertise.5 9 Therefore, while the computer knowledge required of certification
authorities will not per se bar traditional notaries from becoming certification authorities in most states, many commentators believe it is unlikely many of today's notaries will qualify for or have the supporting
computer systems necessary to fulfill the certification authority role. No
doubt this will lead to a concentration of digital signature notarial services in the hands of a few highly qualified certification authorities. 60 To
ensure the necessary level of sophisticated personnel, many commentators believe and some state statutes have mandated, that certification
automated and does not require an engineering degree to operate, a basic understanding of
how computers transfer data among other computers is required."); Slind-Flor, supra note
42, at 16 (noting that cybernotaries will "requir[e] a good understanding of technology in
general
.") (quoting Richard L. Field, a sole practitioner, and a member of the American
Bar Association committee on cybernotaries).
56. See Karla J. Elliot, The Notary Seal-The Last Vestige of NotariesPast, 31 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 903, 907 (1998); see also NOTARY LAW, supra note 4, at 11 ("Seals have been
used to denote a document's authenticity since the days of the Roman Empire when an
officer called a Notarius might impress a seal of metal, mineral or bone, often worn as a
ring, into hot wax.")
57. Unfortunately, even the minimal tasks associated with affixing a notary seal all too
often results in negligent notarial conduct, thus calling into question some notaries' ability
to become cybernotaries. See Closen & Richards, Lost in Cyberspace, supra note 4, at 715
(stating that many of "today's notaries are incapable of performing the most basic functions
of the office (such as ... affixing notary seals ... )).
58. Interestingly, about a dozen states have abolished the obligation of notaries public
to use a notary seal. See Vincent Gnoffo, Comment, Notary Law and Practicefor the 21st
Century: Suggested Modifications for the Model Notary Act, 30 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1063,
1064-65 (discussing the abolishment of the notary seal requirement). For excellent discussions of the history of the notary seal, see generally Elliot, supra note 56; Eric Mills
Holmes, Stature and Status of a Promise UnderSeal as a Legal Formality, 29 WILLAMETTE
L. REV. 617 (1993).
59. See NOTARY LAW, supra note 4, at 500.
60. NOTARY LAW, supra note 4, at 500. See also WARWICK FORD & MICHAEL S. BAUM,
SECURE ELECTRONIC COMMERCE: BUILDING THE INFRASTRUCTURE FOR DIGITAL SIGNATURES

AND ENCRYPTrION 375 (1997) (stating that "many notaries who perform traditional identity
confirmation functions essential to secure electronic commerce are not stereotypical technology-based trusted third parties (such as Certification Authorities), in that they do not
perform the technology-based functions [required], or may not make digital communications a part of their notarial activities"). Cf. Ahlers, supra note 55, at 912 ("Instead of
causing the death of notaries public, technologies might instead increase their
importance.").
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authority eligibility be limited to a select few individuals or professional
organizations (e.g., attorneys, financial institutions, title insurance com61
panies, and government agencies).
Regardless of what or who fulfills the role of certification authority, a
certification authority's principle function remains. That function is to
bind the sender's private key with the recipient's public key, similar to
the way that a notary public would sign and perhaps affix a seal to validate the original execution of a handwritten signature. 62 If the verification is successful,
the certification authority digitally signs and issues a
"certificate,"6 3 which is a computer generated record that identifies the
subscriber as well as the public key and represents that the signer identified in the certificate holds the corresponding private key. 64 This certificate is then placed in an electronic storage facility called a public
repository. 65 Then, a recipient of a digitally signed message will access
the certificate and determine that a public key is associated with a private key possessed by a particular person, obtain a copy of that public
key, and then use that public key to decrypt the digitally-signed message
61. See, e.g., DIGITAL SIGNATURE GUIDELINES, supra note 16, at 31 cmt. 1.6.3. (recommending cybernotaries be "attorneys at law admitted to practice in the United States and
qualified to act as a CyberNotary pursuant to specialization rules currently under development"); Slind-Flor, supra note 42, at 16 (positing that cybernotaries will inhabit "a highlevel legal position... requiring a good understanding of contract law, international law,
technology in general, and [such lawyers will] very likely need to have a substantial legal
infrastructure around them"). See also Shinichi Tsuchiya, A ComparativeStudy of the System and Function of the Notary Pubic in Japan and the United States (May 30-June 1,
1996) in Nat'l Notary Ass'n, Jan. 1997 (available from the National Notary Association).
"It is necessary to have Notaries or CyberNotaries who have acquainted themselves not
only with computer technologies, but also with electronic transactions and related laws.
For this reason, CyberNotaries should be lawyers." Id.
Unfortunately, though, even limiting the availability of those who may serve as Certification Authorities to "professionals" like attorneys does not ensure that moral or ethical
values will prevail in the world of cyberverifications. See, e.g., Iowa State Bar Assoc. v.
Baurele, 460 N.W. 2d 452 (Iowa 1990) (imposing indefinite suspension of attorney-notary's
license for falsely certifying documents); Iowa State Bar Assoc. v. O'Donohoe, 426 N.W.2d
166, 166 (Iowa 1988) (reprimanding attorney-notary for "knowingly making a false statement on a document filed for public record"). See generally Christopher B. Young, Signed,
Sealed, Delivered... Disbarred?NotarialMisconduct by Attorneys, 31 J. MARSHALL L. REV.
1085 (1998).
62. Closen & Richards, Lost in Cyberspace, supra note 4, at 740; Tinnes, supra note 40,
at 429.
63. A "certificate" is a "computer based record which: (a) identifies the Certification
Authority issuing it; (b) names or identifies its subscriber; (c) contains the subscriber's public key; and (d) is digitally signed by the Certification Authority issuing it." UTAH CODE
ANN. § 46-3-103(3) (1998).
64. Brian W. Smith, Digital Signatures:The State of the Art of the Law, 114 BANKING
L. J. 506, 508 (1997); Robertson, supra note 5, at 820.
65. A "repository" is "a system for storing and retrieving certificates and other information relevant to digital signatures." UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-3-103(29) (1998).
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the recipient received. 6 6
V.

67
CRITICISM OF UTAH'S DIGITAL SIGNATURE ACT

In 1995, Utah adopted the nation's first comprehensive legislation
concerning digital signatures. The Utah Act purports to effectuate the
following purposes:
(1) to facilitate commerce by means of reliable messages;
(2) to minimize the incidence of forged digital signatures and fraud in
electronic commerce;
(3) to implement legally the general import of relevant standards, such
as X.509 of the International Telecommunication Union ... ; and
(4) to establish, in accordance with multiple states, uniform rules
re68
garding the authentication and reliability of electronic messages.
Because of the evolving nature of digital signature technology, Utah
included within its comprehensive legislative framework a provision establishing the Division of Corporations and Commercial Code. It is the
Division's role to make rules and regulations governing Certification Authorities beyond the general guidelines already established in the statute-in short, to adopt the rules needed to implement the act. Perhaps
due to the uncertainties surrounding how to develop widespread, yet
flexible legislation in electronic commerce, several of the provisions in
the Utah Act are vague, confusing, or altogether inadequate to deal with
the sophisticated nature of electronic transactions. The effect of this uncertainty is to raise serious concerns as to the Act's overall effectiveness
and, moreover, how it is to be interpreted by the consuming public as
well as by the Division designated to implement it.
The sections that raise the most concern include the following:
* Record-keeping. The division shall specify reasonable require69
ments for record-keeping by licensed certification authorities.
e Personnel. To obtain and keep a license a certification authority
shall employ only individuals who are knowledgeable and proficient in
70
following the Act's requirements.
e Criminal Conviction. To obtain and keep a license a certification
authority shall employ only persons who have not been convicted of a
71
felony or a crime involving fraud, false statement, or deception.
66. Robertson, supra note 5, at 821.
67. For a more thorough discussion of the regulatory provisions of Utah's digital
signature act, see generally Biddle, supra note 11, at 1153-63; Eldridge, supra note 22, at
1828-35.
68. UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-3-102 (Supp. 1998).

69. Id. § 46-3-104.
70. Id.
71. Id. § 46-3-201.
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* Recommended Reliance Limit. Certification authorities are authorized to specify a recommended reliance limit (i.e., bond) beyond
72
which the recipient should not rely.
* Suitable Guaranty.To obtain and keep a license a certification au73
thority shall file with the division a suitable guaranty.
* Residency Requirement. To obtain and keep a license a certification authority shall maintain an office (or designate a registered agent
74
for service of process) in the State.
* Security System Requirements. Licensed certification authorities
75
are required to use trustworthy systems.
* Limited Liability. Any persons who knowingly or intentionally violate the act are subject to civil penalties up to $5,000 per violation or
90% of the recommended reliance limit of a material certificate, which76
ever is less.
* Reasonable Care Requirement. Subscribers must exercise reason77
able care to retain control of their private keys.
a Legal Presumptions. In court-adjudicated disputes, it is presumed
that a licensed certification authority's digitally signed certificate is authentically issued by a licensed certification authority and accepted by
the subscriber, and that the information listed and confirmed in such a
certificate is accurate. 78

A.

RECORD-KEEPING REQUIREMENT

As originally adopted in 1995, the Utah Act did not include a recordkeeping requirement. 79 This changed in 1996, when Utah amended its
Act to specifically authorize the Division to include reasonable requirements for record-keeping by licensing certification authorities.8 0 This requires that certification authorities keep an archive of certificates that
are suspended, revoked, or expired. 8 ' While Utah should be applauded
for amending its statute to include a record-keeping requirement, its provision falls both short and wide of the mark. At least three problems
arise from this record-keeping requirement.
First, the provision is underinclusive in that it obligates the certification authority to keep records of only a limited number of certificates,
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. § 46-3-309.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-3-309.
Id.
Id. § 46-3-301.
Id. § 46-3-203 (Supp. 1998).
Id. § 46-3-305.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-3-406.

See Closen & Richards, Lost in Cyberspace, supra note 4, at 748.

80. UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-3-104(e) (Supp. 1998).

81. Id. § 46-3-501(2)(f).
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which, by implication, have been compromised in some way. By definition, then, all other electronic communications between the certification
authority and subscribers may be destroyed. This is an inappropriate
standard for at least two reasons. First, in practice this standard would
permit the obliteration of the vast majority of certificates, because most
transactions should proceed without complications. Such an approach is
inadequate because it fails to meet the needs and expectations of consumers. Undoubtedly there will be requests from subscribers for duplicate certificates even though the digital signature transaction was
executed flawlessly.8 2 Second, the Utah Act provides that in executing a
certificate, a certification authority must comply with all material requirements of the Act.8 3 Thus it is reasonable for the document signer to
expect that the authentication is being performed correctly and that any
challenge to its validity will fail.8 4 To that end, the document signer has
a right to expect that, if called upon, the certification authority could produce documentation that the signature on the instrument was authenticated in accordance with statutory requirements. 8 5 This proposal is no
more burdensome than the present system of record-keeping expected in
our own personal and business affairs.8 6 Furthermore, notaries public,
whose identification functions closely resemble those of certification authorities', are in many states required to keep journals of their official
acts8 7 and make such records available to the public upon reasonable

82. "Records that are typically required to be maintained and made available upon
authorized request include documentation of a Certification Authority's compliance with
the applicable CPS [Certification Practice Statement] and documentation of actions and
information material to each certificate application and to each certificate issued." FoRD &
BAUM, supra note 60, at 375.
83. Utah Code Ann. § 46-3-309(2)(A) (Supp. 1998).
84. See Peter J. Van Alstyne, The Notary's Duty to Meticulously Maintain a Notary
Journal, 31 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 777, 779 (1998).
85. See Van Alstyne, supra note 84, at 779.
86. See Van Alstyne, supra note 84, at 779 (citing Safety Spelled J-O- U-R-N-A-L, NAT'L
NO'rARY MAG., Nov. 1996, at 16-18). As Mr. Van Alstyne points out:
[tihe keeping of certain records is an inherent responsibility of nearly every responsible adult. For example, record keeping is vital to the survival and legal protection of any business enterprise. As taxpayers, we must be prepared to produce
personal financial records in the event of a tax audit. In many ways, the failure to
maintain a minimal set of records is negligent behavior.
87. Maintaining a notary journal offers benefits beyond mere statutory compliance.
See generally Closen & Richards, Lost in Cyberspace, supra note 4, at 753 n.314. "The
authors have not found a reported appellate case in which a notary who kept a journal
entry was sued for negligence in identifying the document signer. But, there have been
numerous successful tort suits against notaries (and/or their employers or sureties) who
did not keep journal entries and who failed to detect the false identities of signers." Id.
(citations omitted).
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request.8 8 The importance of record-keeping in the electronic signature
verification process has been widely encouraged. As noted by two leading authorities in electronic commerce:
Documentation of activities is indispensable to the operation of a trustworthy [clertification [a]uthority. The [clertification [aluthority must be
able to evidence its proper operations prospectively, as well as after the
fact, to support the non-repudiation of transactions undertaken with
the certificates it issues .... Records may be kept in the form of either
computer-based messages or paper-based documents, provided their indexing, storage,
preservation, and reproduction are accurate and
89
complete.
Thus, certification authorities should be required to keep a record not
only of all "compromised" certificates, but of every certificate issued or
rejected.
A second problem with the Utah Act's limited record-keeping requirement is that it fails to adequately ensure that the record of certificates will be protected from the unscrupulous conduct of others. 90 This
is because certificates are available via on-line repositories where availability is no longer strictly controlled, meaning that certificates are more
vulnerable to unauthorized access and, thus, potential fraud. 9 1 Therefore, because a large certification authority's database might contain
thousands, if not millions, of certificates, it is essential that certification
92
authorities retain written documentation of the certificates issued.
The failure to keep adequate documentation may complicate or delay the
process by which a "compromised" certificate is suspended or revoked,
thus subjecting the certification authority to potential liability to those
third parties who reasonably rely on the certificate's validity only to dis93
cover later that the certificate is unreliable.
The proper maintenance of a journal can further protect the certification authority from false accusations that a cybernotarial act was per88. See Van Alstyne, supra note 84, at 784. Notaries are required to maintain journals
or logs in Alabama, Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas and the District of Columbia. Id. at 778 n.5.
89. FORD & BAUM, supra note 60, at 375.
90. See Closen & Richards, Lost in Cyberspace, supra note 4, at 748.

91. See Eldridge, supra note 35, at 1824 ("Employers of a CA [Certification Authority]
who have access to the certificate database have the potential to cause great harm."); Wyrough & Klein, supra note 5, at 415 ("The chances of fraud and unauthorized access increases as more people use networked computers.").
92. "[IUt is essential for ... databases or repositories to have thorough backup procedures in place.

.

.

. [Tihe careless alteration or loss of a certification could have grave

consequences." Eldridge, supra note 35, at 1820; FoRD & BuAm, supra note 60, at 375 ("Documentation of activities is indispensable to the operation of a trustworthy CA [Certification
Authority].").
93. See Dorney, supra note 19, at 153.
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formed when, in fact, it was not. 94 This prospect presents itself courtesy
of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which permits journals to be admitted
into evidence under the business records exception to the hearsay rule.
Journals may be admitted as evidence if they are kept in the regular
course of the business activity and are entered "at or near" the time of
the recorded act.95 Under the Rules of Evidence, if normal circumstances would have dictated that an event be recorded had it taken place,
then the nonexistence of a record of the event in a journal can prove the
event never occurred. 9 6 "As most perpetrators will not realize that a
journal entry must accompany every [business] act, the absence thereof
will be the smoking gun pointing to the perpetrator's misdeed."97 Thus,
keeping a journal record could guard against private individuals with
access to the certificate database-so called "insiders"-from using their
position to exploit the system. 98 To be sure, just as fraudulent conduct
represents one of the greatest concerns in the notary's world of paper
transactions, 99 so too will it represent a serious problem in cyberspace. 10 0 Given that reducing the likelihood of fraud is one of the primary goals in electronic commerce, 10 1 the need for certification
94. See Van Alstyne, supra note 84, at 781.
95. FED. R. EVID. § 803(6); Van Alstyne, supra note 84, at 780.
96. FED. R. EVID. § 803(7).
97. Van Alstyne, supra note 84, at 781-82.
98. See Eldridge, supra note 35, at 1824.
99. It is not unusual for notaries to have to defend conduct-whether real or
imagined-which is brought on by "insiders," who request or direct them to take shortcuts
or even use the notary's official seal and "notarize" a document without the notary's knowledge. See Van Alstyne, supra note 84, at 781; Young, supra note 61, at 1102; see also
Michael J. Osty, Notary Bonds and Insurance:Increasingthe Protectionfor Consumers and
Notaries,31 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 839, 853 (1998) ("Despite the fact that one notarizes in a
seemingly secure environment, [a] notary can face the danger of an improper notarization

and suffer dire financial consequences."). See, e.g., Independence Leasing Corp. v. Acquino,
506 N.Y.S.2d 1003 (Erie County Ct. 1986) (Employer encouraged notary-employee to take
shortcuts in performing duties); State Life Ins. Co. v. Faucett, 163 S.W.2d 592 (Mo. 1942)
(finding that notary signed a false certificate of acknowledgment, and did nothing to conceal her fraud).
Unfortunately, attorneys who are notaries are guilty of most of these same offenses.
See, e.g., Iowa State Bar Assoc. v. Baurele, 460 N.W.2d 452 (Iowa 1990) (imposing indefinite suspension of attorney-notary's license for falsely certifying documents); Iowa State
Bar Assoc. v. O'Donohoe, 426 N.W.2d 166, 166 (Iowa 1988) (reprimanding attorney-notary
for "knowingly making a false statement on a document filed for public record").
100. See Wright, supra note 7, at 191 ("Just as risks plague the authentication of paper
documents, so too will they plague the authentication of electronic documents."); Closen &
Richards, Lost in Cyberspace, supranote 4, at 732 (noting that "no on-line computer generated transaction seems immune from [fraudulent conduct]"); Marc D. Goodman, Why the
Police Don't Care About Computer Crime, 10 HARv. J. L. & TECH. 465, 472 (1997) (noting

that computer crime is on the rise).
101. Several states assert as their electronic or digital signature legislation's purpose to,
among other things, "minimize the incidence of forged digital [or electronic] signatures and
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authorities to maintain a journal cannot be overemphasized. 10 2
The third problem with the Utah Act's record-keeping requirement
is that certification authorities need only keep an archive of certificates
within at least the past three years. 10 3 By limiting the use of digital
signatures to such a short time period, this provision raises serious policy issues. It is ill-advised to limit the availability of documentary evidence for electronic transactions (e.g., contracts, leases, etc.) that may be
challenged long into the future. 104 As one commentator cogently stated:
"[a]s it would be bad public policy to arbitrarily affix a statute of limitations to the [cybernotarial] act and the [certification authority's] liability
for negligently performing it, it is likewise imprudent to arbitrarily affix
a term of years over which a [record] should be retained."10 5
The retention of certification activity records for a designated period of time is indispensable for many [other] reasons [as well],
including:
" Support or non-repudiation of digitally signed messages;
" Evidence of a [clertification [aluthority's proper performance to
rebut claims of malfeasance; and
@Satisfaction of legislation and regulatory requirements, where
applicable. 106
Thus, just as sound business policy and public policy dictate that
certification authorities retain a record of all the certificates that they
issue and refuse to issue, 10 7 it is also essential for certification authorifraud in electronic commerce." See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-3-102 (1998); FLA.
ANN. § 272.71(3) (West 1998); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325I,02(2) (West 1998).

STAT.

102. The importance of maintaining a journal in the notarial profession has been summarized as follows:
It is every notary's inherent duty of reasonable care to make a careful and complete record of every notarization performed. If properly maintained, the notary's
journal will demonstrate that reasonable care was exercised in every aspect of the
notarial act. It will further establish that the notary routinely exercises reasonable care in the performance of his or her notarial duties. The notary journal
guides the notary through correct notarial procedures for every act, thus minimizing any potential for serious mistakes. As a result, the notary journal is a valuable
protection for the notary against groundless accusations of wrongdoing. It is especially useful for refreshing the notary's memory about the notarial act that took
place years ago.
Van Alstyne, supra note 84, at 778-79; Closen & Richards, Lost in Cyberspace, supranote 4,
at 752-53.
103. UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-3-501(2)(f) (Supp. 1998).
104. Eldridge, supra note 35, at 1831; see also DIGITAL SIGNATURE GUIDELINES, supra
note 16, at 3.5 cmt. 3.5.3.
105. Van Alstyne, supra note 84, at 792.
106. FORD & BAUM, supra note 60, at 376.
107. See Closen & Richards, Supernotaries,supra note 10, at A19; Closen & Richards,
Lost in Cyberspace, supra note 4, at 753; Van Alstyne, supra note 84, at 800. See also FORD
& BAUM, supra note 60, at 208 (noting that the generation of a certificate should include
"record[ing] appropriate details of the certificate generation process in an audit journal").
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ties to carefully preserve and safeguard expired certificates for as long as
the terms of the document it appears on remains in force, and, ideally,
08
for many years thereafter.'

B.

LICENSING REQUIREMENTS

In addition to the problems inherent in the Utah Act's record-keeping requirement noted above, concerns also exist as to the licensing requirement for certification authorities. The Utah Act states that
employers must "employ as operative personnel only persons who have
demonstrated knowledge and proficiency in following the requirements
of [the Act]."109 This provision implicitly requires that employers of certification authorities hire individuals with a good working knowledge of
computer technology in general and digital signature technology in particular. Admittedly, this is a worthwhile goal. But, who determines
whether certification authority employees meet these qualifications? At
present, employers do. Permitting employers to police themselves as to
the qualifications of their own employees to serve as certification authorities is tantamount to putting the "fox in the chicken coop." The only
independent evaluation of a certification authority's qualifications are
annual performance audits by licensed authorities. Unfortunately, however, these audits have the practical effect of "shutting the stable door
after the horse has been stolen."11 0 Indeed, a full year could pass before
a beginning certification authority is investigated, if at all. To be sure, a
significant amount of damage could be done by negligent, illiterate, or
even illegally motivated certification authorities before that time.'
Such omissions should concern both prospective certification authorities
108. See Van Alstyne, supra note 84, at 792 ("The notary should be required to retain
the journal for life.") Cf. FORD & BAUM, supra note 60, at 376 (recommending that Certification Authorities retain records for "no more than 30 years after the date a certificate is
revoked or expired"). See also DIGITAL SIGNATURE GUIDELINES, supra note 16, at 3.5 cmt.
3.5.3. The ABA's comment section states:
The record retention period may depend upon various factors, including: contractual obligations to subscribers, statutory record retention requirements, and business needs. For example, digital signatures used in land transactions may be
contestable for a period specified under local land registry laws, and must be accessible during such period. Subscribers to a Certification Authority involved in
land transactions would therefore have a business need for record retention over
that period.

Id.
109. UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-3-201(1)(b).
th
ed. 1992) ("When the
110. See JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 141 n.10 (16
horse has been stolen, the fool shuts the stable." (quoting Les Proverbes del Vilain, MS
Bodleian (c. 1303)).
111. "Using a Certification Authority's services can involve a considerable amount of
risk and complication even when all parties are acting in good faith. When active subversion of the system is attempted, the risk can be even greater." Eldridge, supra note 34, at
1823.
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as well as those who will look to certification authorities to provide com1 12
petent and professional service.
The statute fails to establish even minimal standards to insure that
certification authorities fully understand the responsibilities of their office prior to becoming licensed certification authorities. For instance,
there are no age requirements, no specific experience requirements and
no education requirements. In short, certification authorities are not required to exhibit in any way a floor level of competency (other than to
their own employers, as noted above) of the digital signature verification
process before becoming licensed, practicing certification authorities. Indeed, "[a]n elementary school dropout could become a [certification au113
thority] and affect commercial transactions worth millions of dollars."
It makes little sense to subject certification authorities to civil penalties and the possible suspension or revocation of their licenses for misfeasance, and at the same time fail to require any instruction, testing or
training on how to adequately perform their jobs. 1 14 Surely it would be
prudent to insist, at a minimum, that certification authorities reach the
age of majority and undergo a course of study in the technology, law, and
ethics of electronic commerce before unleashing them into the electronic
15
marketplace.1
Perhaps aware of the potential pitfalls in Utah's qualification requirements, some state laws either suggest or mandate higher qualification standards for certification authorities. For example, in addressing
the issue of competency newly licensed certification authorities, Mississippi's Digital Signature Act states: "(2) The Secretary of State shall license private [ciertification [a]uthorities, conditioned upon their
16
showing: (a) That they possess proficiency in encryption technology[.]"'
Similarly, Washington addresses the matter of re-testing certification
authorities in its Electronic Authentication Act, where it requires that
the Secretary "provide, by rule, for a system of license renewal, which
17
may include requirements for continuing education."
These Acts represent an improvement over the Utah statute for the
simple reason that they at least consider some of the significant concerns
addressed by commentators.1 i8 Still, however, even the promising provisions such as those noted above typically take the form of suggestions
rather than mandatory requirements. Merely "suggesting" that certification authorities meet the most minimal standards required of the office
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

See Closen & Richards, Lost in Cyberspace, supra note 4, at 746.
See Closen & Richards, Supernotaries,supra note 10, at A19.
See Closen & Richards, Lost in Cyberspace, supra note 4, at 755.
See Closen & Richards, Supernotaries,supra note 10, at A19.
MIsS. CODE ANN. § 25-63-7 (1998) (emphasis added).
WASH. REV. CODE ANN.§ 19.34.101 (West 1998).
See generally Closen & Richards, Lost in Cyberspace, supra note 4, at 755-56.
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of certification authority is insufficient to ensure compliance; more direct
legislative action is needed. The office of certification authority is simply
too important to leave basic requirements such as the education and
testing of certification authorities to chance. Unfortunately, though,
even these rudimentary requirements are rarely considered by legislators. Indeed, the vast majority of state certification authority laws do not
address such issues as age requirements, education, legal and ethical
awareness, statutory requirements, and legal liability at all. Much more
significant state action is required to ensure that certification authorities
meet the needs and expectations of those parties who will expect competent and knowledgeable certification authorities to authenticate their
digital signatures.
C.

CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS

The Utah Act's statute bans anyone who has been convicted of a felony or a crime involving fraud, false statement, or deception from operating as a certification authority. 1 19 This requirement helps keep
potentially unscrupulous persons from serving as licensed certification
authorities. This provision is troublesome in that it is both underinclusive and overinclusive. The requirement is underinclusive in that it creates a statutory loophole by failing to disqualify those persons who may
have a record of fraudulent conduct in a civil or administrative proceeding. 120 The provision is overinclusive in that while it is entirely reasonable to exclude those applicants who committed fraudulent acts from
becoming certification authorities, the same thing cannot be said for
prohibiting all those individuals who have committed felonies, from being licensed certification authorities. In some cases, the punishment (i.e.
exclusion from serving as a certification authority) may not fit the crime.
For instance, what about a non-violent offense such as a felony conviction for involuntary manslaughter? Does such a crime warrant absolute exclusion from becoming a certification authority? It is fair to say
that such crimes have little, if anything, to do with honesty or integrity
of the kind Utah's Digital Signature Act is designed to prevent. It is fair
to say, then, that in totally banning persons convicted of a felony from
becoming licensed as certification authorities, Utah's law does too
much. 12 1 Of course, this does not mean that true "criminals" should be
119. UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-3-201(1)(b) (1998).
120. See Closen & Richards, Supernotaries,supra note 10, at A19.
121. See Richards, supra note 53, at 889. It should be noted that the absolute ban
against convicted persons has not been followed by every state that has enacted
cybernotarial legislation. In Washington, for example, the prohibition extends only to persons who have "been convicted within the past fifteen years of a felony or have ever been
convicted of a crime involving fraud, false statement, or deception." WASH. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 19.34.100(1)(b) (West 1998). Nevertheless, Washington's Act is still unacceptable in that
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allowed to serve as certification authorities. Quite the contrary-all previous felony convictions should be thoroughly investigated to determine
the eligibility status of certification authority applicants. But, upon discovery of a felony conviction, a more equitable and rational means of accessing the qualifications of certification authorities would be to "give
those persons convicted of [such] offenses the opportunity to explain
away their crime-to defend prior misconduct that may or may not call
into question their ability to hold [cybernotarial] office." 1 2 2 This sound
equitable directive should be fully acceptable to both those seeking to
become, and those seeking to ensure the highest standards of, certification authorities, certification authority applicants should be thoroughly
investigated in order to determine their individual qualifications to hold
cybernotarial office. Remarkably, even if a potential certification authority's application reveals that he or she has a prior criminal conviction,
the Utah Act fails to provide that anyone investigate the alleged misconduct contained therein. 12 3 The failure to provide for an investigative
arm of the government to review applications in such a high-tech and
fraudulent-prone industry is not indicative of a progression into the new
millenium, but rather is reminiscent of replicating the failed policies of
the past. Again, it is appropriate to draw an analogy from the tarnished
image of the notary pubic, where "it is not uncommon for notary applicants to lie on their applications concerning past offenses," and where
illegal conduct is a routine occurrence. 12 4 It has been said that insanity
is, by definition, doing the same thing and expecting different results. 125
it retains a fifteen-year period within which the disgrace of a conviction remains. Any such
stigma should be removed from Certification Authority legislation altogether. See also
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325K.05(2) (West 1998). To obtain or retain a license, a Certification
Authority must employ as operative personnel only persons who have not been convicted
within the past 15 years of a felony or a crime involving fraud, false statement, or
deception.
122. Richards, supra note 53, at 890.
123. See Closen & Richards, Lost in Cyberspace, supra note 4, at 746.
124. Richards, supra note 53, at 888 n56. See, e.g., Police Say Man Lied About Criminal
Past, ALLENTOWN MORNING CALL, Apr. 9, 1997, at B3. Unfortunately, the occurrence of
illegal conduct in notarial practice dates back to this country's first appointed notary. "The
American Colonies' first Notary was Thomas Fugill. Appointed in 1639 in the New Haven
Colony, he miserably failed to live up to his duties and was thrown out of office for falsifying documents." NotariesPublic in American History, NOTARY BULL., Apr. 1997, at 3. See
also Florida Bar v. Farinas, 608 So.2d 22 (Fla. 1992) (holding illegal conduct of attorneynotary in failing to personally acknowledge signature before notarizing document warranted public reprimand); Iowa State Bar. Assoc. v. Bauerle, 460 N.W.2d 452 (Iowa 1990)
(imposing indefinite suspension of attorney-notary's license for falsely certifying documents); Iowa State Bar. Assoc. v. O'Donohoe, 426 N.W.2d 166, 166 (Iowa 1988) (reprimanding attorney-notary for "knowingly making a false statement of fact on a document filed for
pubic record"); State Life Ins. v. Faucett, 163 S.W.2d 592 (Mo. 1942) (finding that notary
signed a false certificate of acknowledgment, and did nothing to conceal her fraud).
125. Interview with Craig Anderson (Nov. 26, 1998).
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This point is particularly applicable here, where "[iut would be just plain
to
silly to allow the obvious problems of notaries public to continue
12 6
future."
the
into
[aluthorities
[clertification
of...
office
plague the

D.

RECOMMENDED RELIANCE LIMIT

In an effort to assure a level of financial responsibility for certification authorities, the Utah Act creates a recommended reliance limit,
which is the limitation on the monetary amount recommended for reliance on a certificate. 127 In specifying a reliance limit, certification authorities "recommend that persons rely on the certificate only to the
extent that the total amount of risk does not exceed the recommended
reliance limit."128 In so doing, the certification authority is attempting
to limit liability for his or her own errors or negligence. Thus, a relying
party with notice of the recommended reliance limit should not expect to
recover an amount in excess of the specified amount because such reli12 9
ance may be unreasonable.
This ambiguous provision raises significant concerns. First, because
the limit is only a "recommended" limit, questions arise as to what constitutes a reasonable reliance limit. Will the limit vary from transaction
to transaction? Are there reliance limits under which it is per se unreasonable for a party to rely?
Second, it is unclear whether the "recommended" reliance limit has
the legal effect of capping liability. This is because the reliance limit is a
dollar amount, determined by the certification authority and the subscriber pursuant to the principles of private contracting. Nevertheless, a
certification authority is by statute not liable in excess of the amount
specified in the certificate as its recommended reliance limit unless he or
she waives the application of this provision. 130 So, does the recommended reliance serve as a de facto liability cap for certification authorities notwithstanding any private agreement to the contrary? Moreover,
in an open system like the Internet, is it possible for a certification authority to control-or even ascertain-potential liability when an unlimited and unknowable number of third parties rely on the same
126. See Closen & Richards, Lost in Cyberspace, supra note 4, at 756. As Oliver Wendell
Holmes Jr. once said: "The life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience." THE
COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
127. UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-3-103(28) (1998).
128. Id. § 46-3-309.
129. See DIGITAL SIGNATURE GUIDELINES, supra note 16, at 65 cmt. 3.3.2. "If a relying
party has notice of such a recommended limit on reliance, reliance in excess of the specified
amount may well be unreasonable .. . since a relying person would have notice that the
certificate was not considered suitable for transactions in excess of the specified amount."
130. UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-3-309(2)(b) (1998).
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13 1

certificate?
Third, is a "private" reliance limit arrangement between a certification authority and a subscriber even permitted? After all, certification
authorities are not purely private parties, but rather governmentally licensed public officers, akin to a notary public. As such, the issue arises
whether a state officer can limit its liability for its wrongdoing?
Finally, a more basic question is created by the recommended reliance limit in light of the surety bond or letter of credit that licensed certification authorities must obtain to operate. If a certification authority
can be held liable for negligence up to the amount on the bond or letter of
credit, then the recommended reliance limit seems duplicative. 13 2 Notaries public, as bonded public officials, do not issue recommended reliance
limits for those who seek their services. What purpose, then, does the
reliance limit serve? If the recommended reliance limit is in fact intended to cap liability, then why not simply require the certification authority to state his or her bond amount on certificates issued. If Utah's
purpose was to foster confusion and uncertainty as to the liability limits
of its certification authorities by creating its recommended reliance limit,
13 3
it succeeded.

E. SUITABLE GUARANTY
One of the most important provisions of the Utah Act is its requirement that each licensed certification authority, other than government
entities, must file a suitable guaranty with the Division.13 4 It is the Division's responsibility to determine an amount appropriate for a suitable
guaranty in light of the burden the requirement imposes on licensed certification authorities and the financial assurance it provides to those who
rely upon the certificate's authenticity. 35 A suitable guaranty is defined
as either a surety bond or an irrevocable letter of credit in an amount
appropriate to protect those relying on certificates issued by the licensed
certification authority. 136 This provision, like the recommended reliance
limit noted above, is also fraught with deficiencies.
While the provision serves to limit the certification authority's liability for errors or negligence to the face amount of the guaranty, it does not
131. See DIGITAL SIGNATURE GUIDELINES, supra note 16, at 65 cmt. 3.3.2.
132. For example, California's digital signature act holds Certification Authorities liable
up to the amount on their surety bond or letter of credit, but do not require cybernotaries to
post a recommended reliance limit. See Philip Bane, Banking and Payment Processing on
the Internet: How Should the Risk Be Allocated?, 482 PLI/Pat 665, 679 (1997).
133. See Closen & Richards, Lost in Cyberspace, supranote 4, at 747 (noting that Utah's
recommended reliance limit "raises more questions and concerns than it answers").
134. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-3-201(1)(d) (1998).
135. Id. § 46-3-104(3)(b).
136. Id. §§ 46-3-103(34); 46-3-104(3)(ii).
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set a specific dollar amount. 137 By not specifying a minimal amount of
financial responsibility for certification authorities, the statute fails to
remedy some of the most fundamental reasons why the office of notaries
public has received so little respect over the years. 13 8 Indeed, today's
notary bond amounts are so low as to be essentially worthless,' 39 assuming they are even required at all. 140 Nevertheless, the Utah Act remains
silent on the issue.
Nor does Utah's law require that certification authorities carry liability insurance, which is a fundamental flaw in notary law and practice. 14 1 This is unfortunate, because just as errors and omissions
insurance can protect notaries and the public from dire financial loss, so
too can such coverage protect the certification authority and victims of
the certification authority's negligence. 142 Mandatory errors and omis137. Id. § 46-3-103(34)(b).
138. Closen & Richards, Lost in Cyberspace, supra note 4, at 749.
139. See Michael L. Closen, Why Notaries Get Little Respect, NATL L.J., Oct. 9, 1995, at
A23 (stating that notary bonds are "so low that [they are] useless and misleading.");
Michael L. Closen & Michael J. Osty, The Illinois Notary Bond Deception, ILL. POL. MAG.,
Mar. 1995, at 13-14 (noting that the $5,000 Illinois notary bond "represents a mere symbol,
left over from legislation outdated generations ago."). To illustrate:
In the 1800s, when notary bonds were first introduced, the bond limits were typically $500 to $5,000. At that time, this was a substantial amount of coverage for a
wrongful notarial act. Throughout the years, the number of notaries and notarizations grew, carriages turned into Cadillacs, and the price of consumer goods
skyrocketed. Yet, the notary bond has failed to mirror the economic changes. The
Illinois notary bond is a prime example of that failure. In 1913, the Illinois notary
bond was $1,000. Between 1913 and 1997, the cost of consumer goods rose dramatically. If in 1913 you bought goods or services priced at $1,000, those same
goods or services would cost you $16, 260, in 1997. However, Illinois, like all other
states mandating a bond, failed to match the protection of the bond with escalating consumer prices. In 1986, Illinois raised the bond limit to where it currently
stands at $5,000. This $5,000 limit was hardly a significant amount at the time,
and eleven years later, it constitutes a completely irrelevant sum in light of the
above analysis.
Michael J. Osty, Notary Bonds and Insurance: Increasingthe Protectionfor Consumers and
Notaries, 31 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 839, 848-49 (1998).
See also Brent Beaty, Claims Against Notary Pubic Bonds, AM. NOTARY MAG., January-February 1996, at 7 (illustrating the ineffectiveness of the notary bond).
140. See Gnoffo, supra note 58, at 1073 (noting that 20 states do not require notaries to
be bonded).
141. See Closen & Richards, Lost in Cyberspace, supra note 4, at 747; Closen & Osty,
supra note 139, at 14. See also Closen, supra note 139, at A24 (proposing that "The states
should ... mandate substantial errors and omissions insurance [for notaries].").
142. See, e.g., Derrick Huckleberry, Errors & Omissions Insurance:The Ultimate Protection!, AM. NOTARY MAG., 1' Quarter 1998, at 1 (citing instance where notary would have
been personally liable for $9,000 had she not had errors and omissions insurance). Errors
and omissions insurance works like this:
An action against the notary for misconduct triggers the claims procedure. If a
notary is found liable for negligence, the E&O [errors and omissions] policy will
cover the damages up to the limit on the policy. Unlike the low and practically
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sions insurance for certification authorities is necessary for at least two
good reasons. First, considering the magnitude of commercial transactions found in today's business environment, whatever bond amount is
set by statute or by the certification authority's themselves will-judging
by history-be insufficient to protect both the certification authority and
the victim of the certification authority's misconduct. 143 Second, even
assuming that a substantial bond amount is set for certification authorities, a bond is still insufficient to protect certification authorities themselves from financial catastrophe. This is because, unlike errors and
omissions coverage, a bond is not true insurance. 144 In the event of misconduct, a bond would not protect the certification authority because the
bond company will seek reimbursement from the notary for any amount
they are required to pay on the bond. 145 For that reason, more financial
responsibility is necessary to insure that the certification authority is
fully accountable to, and fully protected from, persons claiming losses
arising out of the certification authority's misfeasance. After all,
shouldn't the public be able to trust the services rendered by a governmentally-licensed pubic officer?' 4 6 Absent substantial minimum bond
requirements and mandatory errors and omissions insurance for certification authorities, the office of certification authority may be doomed
147
before it gets off the ground.
useless limits of the notary bond, an E&O policy can have a substantial higher
limit, even exceeding $250,000. A further benefit of an E&O policy is that it covers
the notary's legal fees incurred while defending against the claim. This is true
whether or not the claimant recovers. Additionally, if the notary did negligently
perform the duties of his or her office, the E&O policy will cover the resulting
damages up to the limit of the policy. Though this protection is readily available
today, most notaries are unaware that it even exists.
Osty, supra note 139, at 852.
143. See supra note 139.
144. See Closen & Osty, supra note 140, at 13 (noting that "a bond is not insurance.")
145. See Gnoffo, supra note 58, at 1074. Bond companies are truly the winners in this
bond-for-fee arrangement. See Osty, supra note 140, at 851.
In 1997, there were over 2.3 million notaries in the states requiring a notary bond.
With the average premium for a four year bond being about $75, the money collected for these bonds is significant. The profit earned from notaries by surety
companies is by no means small either.... [For example, in a study based on two
surety companies,] results showed that, over a four year period, the two bonding
companies collected over $970,000 in premiums. During that same period, the
companies disbursed only $2,277.50 in claims that they could not recoup from the
notaries.
Id. at 850-51.
146. Closen & Richards, Lost in Cyberspace, supra note 4, at 748.
147. See Closen & Richards, Lost in Cyberspace, supra note 4, at 748 (Utah and other
states, which set small bonds, no bonds, and no insurance or meaningful financial responsibility requirements, are signaling the direction for cybernotaries and dooming cybernotaries to positions of insignificance or serious trouble.")
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F.

RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT

The Utah Act requires that one must maintain an office or have a
registered agent in the state for service of process to qualify as a certification authority.' 48 Does this mean that a certification authority licensed by the State of Utah can authenticate a digital signature
transaction that originates from a sender in California and is directed to
a recipient in New York? If the Utah certification authority happens to
be traveling with laptop in Illinois at the time, can the same transaction
be verified? Which state law should govern such cases? In the first situation, what courts could exercise proper jurisdiction over the certification
authority? If the second situation is possible, does the answer change?
Even though-or perhaps because-the drafters of the Utah Act relied
on notary law as a basis for many of its provisions, these questions remain unanswered. 149 This results in part due to the fact that jurisdictional issues presented in cyberspace are very different from those
presented in traditional notary law and practice.' 5 0 For instance, notaries public must generally be a resident of the state in which they act,
and have authority only in their counties, parishes, or towns of residence. 15 1 This general rule is also true in Utah, where notaries cannot
notarize documents while physically outside the State. l5 2 However, absent written directives addressing the geographic authority of certification authorities, the question of whether certification authorities are
similarly limited remains open. The coming of electronic commerce and
the authority and liability of those who participate in it has spawned a
tremendous amount of debate in general.
Utah does not need to fan the flames on issues such as the geographic authority of a certification authority. Perhaps, consistent with
the Utah Act's stated purpose of "establishing, in coordination with multiple states, uniform rules regarding the authentication of electronic
messages," Utah could adopt a broad legislative scheme that would permit notaries to act nationally and/or internationally, much like attorneys
who can be admitted to practice in another state on motion. 15 3 Such an
148. UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-3-201(1)(g) (1998).

149. See Biddle, supranote 11, at 1179 (noting that notary law and practice "appears to
have been a model which was actively contemplated by the drafters of the Utah Act").
150. For a further discussion of the jurisdictional issues presented in the world of
cyberspace, see generally supra note 6 and accompanying text.
151.

WESLEY GILMER JR., ANDERSON'S MANUAL FOR NOTARIES PUBLIC § 2.10 (5'

ed.

1976). See, e.g., CAL. Gov. CODE § 8201(a) (West 1992) (residency required); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 14-12-2(a) (Michie 1995) (residency required). In Alabama and Kentucky, notaries
have countywide authority, but in Louisiana they have authority only in their parishes.
Comparisonof State Notary Provisions, NAT'L NOTARY MAO., May 1996, at 32.
152. See Comparison of State Notary Provisions,supra note 150, at 32 (showing that
Utah notaries have statewide jurisdiction).
153. See Closen & Richards, Lost in Cyberspace, supra note 4, at 753.
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approach is not only more consistent with the "borderless" nature of electronic commerce, but it also furthers another of Utah's stated goals "to
facilitate commerce by means of reliable electronic messages[.]" 15 4 Regardless of the particular form of geographic authority chosen, some legislative direction is necessary in order to address the variety of questions
presented by this residency requirement. 155
G.

TRUSTWORTHY SYSTEM

The Utah Act requires that certification authorities use a "trustworthy system" when fulfilling the essential requirements of his or her position.' 5 6 A trustworthy system is defined in the statute as "computer
hardware and software which: (a) are reasonably secure from intrusion
and misuse; (b) provide a reasonable level of availability, reliability, and
correct operation; and (c) are reasonably suited to performing their intended functions." 157 By virtue of the Utah Act's status as "digital signature" legislation and its "key pair" security system, the statute limits the
use of "trustworthy system" to encryption technology, or, more specifically, "asymmetric cryptography."1 58 Because of its public key/private
key configuration, many believe asymmetric cryptography is the heart of
digital signature technology. 15 9 Without question, encryption technology is one of the most popular and secure forms of electronic transmission security procedures currently on the market. However, asymmetric
cryptography, like the electronic cryptography programs that preceded
16°
it,
will soon be replaced by even faster and more secure anti-fraud
devices. Case in point are the numerous other encryption methods which
already claim to be at least as secure as the asymmetric cryptosystem,
and the many others which are currently in development. 16 1 For this
154. UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-3-102 (1998).
155. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.34.503 (West 1998) "Issues regarding jurisdiction, venue, and choice of laws for all actions involving digital signatures must be determined according to the same principles as if all transactions had been performed through
paper documents." Id.
156. Id. § 46-3-301.
157. Id. § 46-3-103(38).
158. Utah defines "asymmetric cryptosystem" as "an algorithm or series of algorithms
which provide a secure key pair." Id. § 46-3-103(1)(2). See supra note 19 (defining digital
signature).
159. See DIGITAL SIGNATURE GUIDELINES, supra note 16, at 27 cmt. 1.3.1 (stating that
asymmetric cryptography reflects "the core of digital signature technology").
160. See supra note 134 (discussing "private key" or symmetric cryptography).
161. See Closen & Richards, Lost in Cyberspace, supra note 4, at 752. One such alternative strategy is Pen Biometrics Technology ("PenOp"), which functions like the traditional
paper and ink method and asserts to spread the risk in the signing of electronic documents
among many baskets by requiring a hacker to compromise security features allocated
among several different parties rather than among a single, vulnerable private-key holder
(such as that employed in asymmetric cryptography). See generally Wright, supra note 7.
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reason, many states have opted, as others have suggested, for a more
open, less technologically specific, approach. For example, in the State of
California a bill resembling the Utah Act was introduced in the California legislature in 1995 which proposed particular technological standards for the creation of digital signatures. 16 2 It soon met strong
resistance from members of California's computer industry, who were
concerned that any such specific protocol would stifle technological
growth in the electronic communications arena. 16 3 As a result, the California legislature passed a much more open act which did not impose any
64
particular technological standards.'
Similarly, numerous other states enacted technology neutral definitions of digital or electronic signatures, 165 as several commentators have
suggested. 166 This is partly because any attempt to marshal the considerable resources necessary to unseat an already established state-approved security procedure will be difficult and time consuming, thereby
decreasing competition in the market and the incentive to develop more
advanced security-based systems. Our own personal experience with
computers has taught us that technology advances so rapidly that computers must be updated regularly so as not to become practically obsolete. The same reasoning applies to encryption technology. Moreover,
given the broad authority the Utah Act gives to the Division to make
rules and regulations governing certification authorities, the law could
have delegated to the Division the responsibility of adopting secure verification systems as they became available. Actually, some states have
chosen to do just that. 1 67 Simply put, the development of security measures must not be impeded as the opportunities for fraud in electronic
162. See Dorney, supra note 19, at 158.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-2616 (Supp. 1998); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-12-3 (1998).
But see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 282.72 (West 1998).
166. See, e.g., Elizabeth Wasserman, Signing On With Digital Signatures-New Laws
May Allow Computer Validation,PHOENIX GAZ., Aug. 29, 1995, at Al (positing that security
restrictions may hamper rather than promote the use of other technologies); Kennedy &
Davids, supra note 38, at S4 ("It may be prudent, in drafting [future] digital signature
legislation, also to accommodate the possibility of systems with alternative security based
on methods other than public Certification Authorities and the public key repositories.").
167. See, e.g., ILLINOIs ACT, supra note 18. The Illinois Commission provides in part:
(a) The Secretary of State may adopt rules applicable to both the public and private sectors for the purpose of defining when a certificate is considered trustworthy.., such that a digital signature verified by reference to such a certificate will
be considered a qualified security procedure .... The rules may include (1) establishing or adopting standards applicable to certification authorities or
certificates ....
(b) In developing the rules, the Secretary of State shall endeavor to do so in a
manner that will provide maximum flexibility to the implementation of digital signature technology and the business models necessary to support it ....
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168
commerce continue to grow.

H.

LIMITED LIABILITY

The Utah Act limits the recovery for loss due to a negligent certification authority's conduct to direct compensatory damages. 169 Such damages do not include:" (i) punitive or exemplary damages; (ii) damages for
lost profits, savings, or opportunity; or (iii) damages for pain or suffering."170 Presumably, the drafter's intent in adopting this limited liability provision was to encourage development of the certification industry,
for it was feared that exposing certification authorities to substantial liability would prohibit some certification authorities from entering the
17 1
market.
Limiting liability in such a manner is ill-advised for two reasons.
First, it may be unnecessary to provide incentives for certification authorities to enter the industry because "profit motive" alone is one of the
strongest motivations for entry. Indeed, the potential revenue that
would result from the execution of thousands, if not millions, of digital
signatures will likely provide sufficient encouragement for certification
authorities to begin operating. Even assuming, however, that some kind
of incentive is required, states can achieve equivalent or comparable results through significantly less restrictive means. For instance, perhaps
the State could act as a temporary, low-cost insurer of certification authorities until the private insurance market has time to develop an appropriate and affordable insurance package. 1 72 This would decrease the
certification authority's start-up costs, and moreover, promote the development of an industry equally as important to the formation and success
of the cyberverification industry-the liability insurance market.
Second, shifting the risks of loss from the certification authority to
innocent subscribers and/or relying third parties is an undesirable public
policy. 173 Assume, for example, a malicious third party impersonates a
(c) The Secretary of State shall have exclusive authority to adopt rules authorized
by this Section.
Id. at 55. In its commentary section, the Commission explains: "It is important not to
adopt regulations that might unduly restrict the development and implementation of digital signature technology to facilitate electronic commerce." Id. at 57.
168. See Froomkin, supra note 45, at 68 ("As the amount of Internet commerce grows,
the opportunities for fraud may grow unless security and authentication measures also

grow.").
169. UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-3-309(2)(c) (1998).
170. Id. § (2)(c)(i)(ii)(iii). But see WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 19.34.280(2)(c) (Supp. 1998)
(including within its compensatory damages provision "lost profits, savings, or
opportunity").
171. See Biddle, supra note 11, at 1192; Singer, supra note 30, at 734.
172. See Biddle, supra note 11, at 1192.
173. Id.
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subscriber and, due to the certification authority's negligence, gains access to a certificate and uses it to withdraw funds from the subscriber's
bank account.1 7 4 Under the Utah Act, the certification authority would
be liable only for the loss up to the suitable guaranty (or reliance limit of
the certificate). This is so even though the certification authority's suitable guaranty may not be so "suitable" from the subscriber's perspective
in that the coverage may be far lower than the subscriber's actual losses.
Shouldn't the law protect the public from the negligent or even intentional misconduct of certification authorities rather than increase the
likelihood of certification authorities acting irresponsibly. If certification
authorities do not have to bear the full financial responsibility (beyond a
minimal bond amount) for any losses resulting from their misdeeds,
what incentive do they have to take expensive precautions against that
occurrence? 17 5 Isn't is fair to hold the certification authority, as a public
officer, more accountable to the public which it serves? After all, even
notary law (which leaves much to be desired in many respects) provides
that notaries may be held liable for all proximately caused injuries resulting from the notary's negligent, reckless, or willful conduct. 1 76 And
this liability may even extend to the notary's employer under the common law theory of vicarious liability 17 7 or even the employer responsibil1 78
ity provisions of some state notary statutes.
A better approach would be to hold certification authorities liable for
all proximately caused injuries. Such an approach is beneficial not only
to motivate certification authorities to obtain substantial minimum bond
amounts, but more importantly to encourage certification authorities to
174. See Eldridge, supra note 22, at 1835-36.
175. Biddle, supra note 11, at 1192.
176. See Closen & Dixon, supra note 50, at 891. See, e.g., Kork Corp. v. First Am. Title
Co., 270 Cal. Rptr. 24 (Ct. App. 1990) (noting liability of notary predicated on proximately
caused injury by negligent act); Tutleman v. Agric. Ins. Co., 102 Cal. Rptr. 296 (Ct. App.
1972) (noting the fact that execution of false deed was a proximate cause was enough to
establish notary liability); Common Wealth Ins. Sys. Inc. v. Kersten, 115 Cal. Rptr. 653 (Ct.
App. 1974) (holding notary public liable for all proximately cause injuries); Garton v. Title
Ins. & Trust Co., 165 Cal. Rptr. 449 (Ct. App. 1980) (stating notary public can be held liable
for all proximately caused injuries from negligently acknowledged deed).
177. See generally Gerald Haberkorn & Julie Z. Wul; The Legal Standard of Carefor
Notaries and Their Employers, 31 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 735 (1998); J. Michael Gottschalk,
Comment, The Negligent Notary Public-Employee:Is His Employer Liable?, 48 NEB. L. REV.
503 (1969); Closen, supra note 43, at 675-81. See, e.g., Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Valley Natl
Bank, 462 P.2d 814, 818 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1969) (holding employer liable for its notary-employees misconduct because employers practice of having a notary available was a way of
improving customer relations); Garton v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 106 Cal.App.3d 365 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1980) (holding that employers can be liable for notary misconduct, including intentional official misconduct, under the ordinary vicarious liability principles); Iselin-Jefferson
Fin. Co. v. United California Bank, 549 P.2d 42 (Cal. 1976) (same).
178. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 51-118 (1996).
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obtain meaningful errors and omissions insurance (which, as noted
above, may be temporarily subsidized by the state). While the private
insurance industry may not develop immediately, insurance companies
would quickly organize risk pools of certification authorities to spread
the cost of the insurance over the entire pool of certification authorities
and, thus, develop an affordable insurance package.1 79 Further, the insurance limit would likely be substantially higher than any bond requirements set by the parties individually. This approach would have
the important benefits of fostering more trust and confidence in the electronic signature verification process, as well as protecting both the certification authority and the public from the risk of serious monetary loss.
I.

REASONABLE CARE

Under the Utah Act, users of digital signatures are held to a standard of reasonable care in preserving the disclosure of their private
key.18 0 Given the universal goal of ensuring secure electronic commerce,
this standard is entirely inadequate.' 8 ' Is it too much to ask that the
private key holder keep his private key secret?' 8 2 The integrity of any
digital signature message begins with the sender of the message-the
private key holder. As such, the private key holder should be required to
retain exclusive control of the private key to prevent its unauthorized
use.' 8 3 This heightened standard is more consistent with the overriding
concern for fraud and theft in electronic commerce. If private key holders were informed as to their full legal responsibility for use of their
keys, they would undoubtedly be more careful safeguarding their private
84
keys.'
Unlike the "reasonable care" standard imposed by the Utah Act, a
duty to retain "exclusive control" of the private key would, moreover,
greatly increase public confidence in digital and electronic signature verifications. Furthermore, for the same reasons that insurance companies
would likely insure certification authorities against errors and omis179. See Closen & Osty, supra note 140, at 13; Biddle, supra note 11, at 1192.
180. UTAH CODE ANN.§ 46-3-305 (1998).
181. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-3-102 (Supp. 1998) (stating as one of its Act's purpose to "minimize the incidence of forged digital signatures and fraud in electronic commerce"); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325K02(2) (West 1998) (same); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 282.71(3)
(1998) ("It is the intent of the legislature that this act: ...Minimize the incidence of forged
electronic signatures and fraud in electronic commerce."); IND. STAT. ANN. § 5-24-1-1(b)(1)
(1998) (One goal of the Act is to "minimize the incidence of forged signatures and fraud in
commerce.").
182. See Wright, supra note 7, at 193.
183. See CAL.Gov'T CODE § 16.5 (West 1998) By accepting a certificate issued by a Certification Authority, the subscriber assumes a duty to retain exclusive control of the private
key and keep it confidential. Id.
184. See Closen & Richards, Lost in Cyberspace, supra note 4, at 753.
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sions, so too would they cover private key holders against theft or loss of
a private key. i8 5 Like errors and omissions insurance, private key insurance would have the added benefit of assuring certification authorities
and their intended recipients of recovering damages in the event of loss.
If digital signature verifications are to achieve the prominence and sophistication they are hoped to, a high level of accountability for private
key holders is required.
J.

EVIDENTIARY PRESUMPTIONS

The Utah Act, like most other digital and electronic signature laws,
provides that digital signatures are as valid as paper signatures, 8 6 and
thus can constitute a writing.' 8 7 Under American law, the general rule
when challenging the authenticity of a signature is that the signature is
presumed invalid, but is subject to being rebutted in the wake of sufficient evidence. 188 However, the Utah Act obviates this traditional standard by clothing a verifiable digital signature with a presumption of
validity that the challenger must counter.' 8 9 Under Utah's legislative
scheme, all digitally-signed documents are acknowledged' instruments
and achieve a presumption of validity.' 90 Specifically, the Utah Act provides that if a digital signature is verified by the public key listed in a
valid certificate issued by a licensed certification authority, the court
shall presume that the digital signature is that of the person listed in the
certificate. In other words, it was affixed by that person with the intention of signing the message, and that the recipient had no knowledge or
notice that the signer breached any duty owed to the certification authority or does not rightfully hold the private key used to manufacture the
signature. 19 1 The effect of this provision is to shift the initial burden of
proof to the private key holder or subscriber. 192 This is so even though
19 3
there need be no third-party witness to the digital signing.
By shifting the risk in this way, the Utah Act presumably hoped to
minimize the risk that the person using the public/private key pair
might be an imposter. 194 As a practical matter, however, the shifting of
risk to the private key holder does not reduce such a risk, but rather
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
(Supp.
192.
193.
194.

Id. at 754.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-3-401(1) (Supp. 1998).
Id. § 46-3-401(1).
See Closen, supra note 44, at 685.
See Eldridge, supra note 35, at 1833.
See Biddle, supra note 11, at 1182.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-3-406(3) (1998). But see GA. CODE ANN. § 10-12-1 to -5
1997) (no provision for evidentiary presumptions in the use of electronic signatures).
See Wright, supra note 7, at 194.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-3-405 (Supp. 1998).
See Wright, supra note 7, at 193.

906

JOURNAL OF COMPUTER & INFORMATION LAW

[Vol. XVII

transfers it. 19 5 Instead of placing the burden on the party challenging
the digital signature, the burden is simply shifted to the private key
holder to counter the presumption of validity with evidence to support its
invalidity. The model contemplated by the drafters of this evidentiary
presumption theory appears to have been the notary model. 19 6 It is regularly the case that the acts of public officers are entitled to a presumption of validity. 19 7 As public officers, the activities of notaries public
similarly enjoy this evidentiary presumption. 198 For example, if there is
a challenge to a notarization, the party objecting to the notarization
must present evidence to overcome the notarization's presumption of validity. 199 After the initial showing of wrongdoing, the evidentiary burden shifts to the notary to counter with evidence to support the
notarization. 20 0 Shifting the burden to the notary in this case is justified
201
only after the initial showing of negligence on the part of the notary.
The same burden shifting rational cannot be advanced for cybernotarizations, however. This is because, unlike notary law, the digitally-signed
documents are not certified individually in the presence of certification
authorities-cyberspace's functional equivalent of notaries public. The
physical presence of the notary to a document signing is an essential reason for its presumed reliability in legal proceedings. Thus, when the
physical presence aspect is gone, the same assurances of genuineness go
too. As a result, digitally-signed documents should not receive the same
assurance of reliability that instruments signed in the physical presence
of a notary achieve, and therefore, should not enjoy the same legal
20 2
status.
Furthermore, the shift in burden places an unreasonable evidentiary responsibility upon the victims of fraud. 20 3 Because digital signature transactions permit strangers to contract electronically, there will
likely be less evidence surrounding the events of the digital signature, as
compared to the traditional signing of a paper document. 20 4 This problem is only exacerbated by the Utah Act's minimal record-keeping re195. Id. at 194.
196. See Biddle, supra note 11, at 1180.
197. See Closen, supra note 44, at 681. See, e.g., Eveleigh v. Conness, 933 P.2d 675, 682
(Kan. 1997) (noting that the presumption that a public officer has performed the duties of
his or her office faithfully); In re Medlin, 201 B.R. 188, 192 (E.D. Tenn. 1996)
("[P]resumption that sworn public officers have properly executed their duties absent evidence to the contrary.").
198. Closen, supra note 44, at 681.
199. See Closen, supra note 44, at 684.
200. Id.
201. See Biddle, supra note 11, at 1180.
202. Biddle, supra note 11, at 1180.
203. See Biddle, supra note 11, at 1180-81.
204. Eldridge, supra note 35, at 1833.
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quirement, which permits certification authorities to immediately
20 5
destroy all written documentation of validly executed transactions.
The burden shifting is similarly unreasonable in that it is inconsistent
with the standard of care required of private key holders. Utah's law
requires only that private key holders use "reasonable care" to keep their
private keys private. Thus, a careless private key holder who allows his
private key to end up in the hands of a third party may find himself
being held legally responsible for documents signed with the key, even if
he did not approve the signing.20 6 If a private key holder may be held
liable for an unauthorized signature, and that signature is then presumed valid, the duty of care in safeguarding the private key should reflect that responsibility.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Utah Digital Signature Act fails on several levels. Many of the
Act's provisions are vague, confusing, or altogether insufficient to adequately address the many new legal and policy issues presented by
cyberspace. As a result, its rightful status as a "model Act" is questionable. Thus, numerous changes of the kind noted in this article are needed
to prevent the undermining of such a promising future for
cyberverifications.

205. See supra section 1.
206. See Eldridge, supra note 35, at 1833; Wright, supra note 7, at 193.
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